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 Naturalistic philosophers aim to understand the world on the basis of science.  A 
naturalist takes empirical evidence to be the ultimate arbiter of our beliefs.  As naturalists, 
our investigations of the nature of truth itself should respect this empiricist methodology.  
In this essay, I argue that the existence and character of truth are open empirical 
questions, to be answered by scientific inquiry.  I then argue against an a priori proof of 
the existence of truth. 
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If we draw our ontological and theoretical commitments exclusively from our 
well-confirmed scientific theories, as naturalistic philosophers typically say that we 
should, then we should regard questions about the existence and nature of truth as 
empirical questions to be decided by our scientific inquiries.  We should accept that truth 
exists if and only if it is a required element of our best scientific models, and we should 
accept that truth has all and only the properties assigned to it by those models.  It follows 
that a priori inquiry alone cannot be taken as the ultimate arbiter concerning the nature or 
existence of truth.  Empirical inquiry is the ultimate arbiter of our commitments, even our 
commitment to truth.  Call this doctrine truth empiricism. 
One who thinks that truth, if it exists, is a part of the natural world should not treat 
the notion of truth as logically or conceptually prior to our conception of the rest of 
reality.  Nor is such a naturalist to accept, on purely a priori grounds, an account 
according to which the existence or nature of truth is necessary for our ability to 
understand or theorize about the properties, objects, and events found in nature.  Instead, 
truth is to be considered just another property to be triangulated within the natural world 
by scientific methods, if it is to be found there at all.  For such a naturalist, the existence 
and nature of truth is no more epistemically perspicuous than the existence or nature of 
any other aspect of scientifically revealed reality.  Nor is it more metaphysically 
fundamental than the rest of reality.  Nor does investigation into the nature of truth 
occupy a privileged position in the philosophical dialectic. 
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There is a long tradition of philosophers who have embraced such an empirical 
approach to truth.  The hard-nosed empiricists of the Vienna Circle led by Otto Neurath 
and including Rudolph Carnap debated whether the traditional notion of truth might lead 
scientists into metaphysical “pseudoproblems”.  Not only did Neurath think the sciences 
could do without a notion of truth, he argued that they should actively work to eliminate 
truth talk altogether.1 
In the wake of logical empiricism, many scientifically inclined philosophers 
continued to implicitly endorse empiricism about truth.  W. V. O. Quine’s arguments 
from the indeterminacy of translation were aimed at showing that truth and other 
semantic properties needed to be radically deflated on the grounds that no empirical 
evidence could support robust claims about them.2  The next generation of philosophers, 
largely under the influence of Quine, were suspicious of including semantic properties in 
their ontology unless the theory of semantics made adequate contact with the physical 
sciences.  Many thought that semantic facts were acceptable only if they could be 
reduced to the non-semantic facts recognized by the natural sciences.  Thus, Hartry Field 
writes “Semanticalism is the doctrine that there are irreducibly semantic facts…as a 
physicalist I believe that [semanticalism] must be rejected.”3   Expressing the same 
sentiment, Jerry Fodor writes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a discussion of Neurath’s views on truth, see Mancosu, P. “Tarski, Neurath and 
Kokoszynska on the Semantic Conception of Truth”, in D Patterson (ed) New Essays on 
Tarski, Oxford: OUP, 2008, 192-224; Mormann, T. “Neurath’s Opposition to Tarskian 
Semantics”, in Wolenski, J. and E. Kohler (eds) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle, 
Dordrecht: Springer , 1999,  165-199. 
2 Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word & Object. The Mit Press. 
3 Field, H. (1972). Tarski's theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375. 
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I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they’ve been 
compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things.  When they do, the likes of 
spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their list.  But aboutness surely won’t; 
intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep…if the semantic and the intentional are real 
properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their 
supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic.  If 
aboutness is real, it must really be something else.4 
 
The reductionist project is not identical with truth empiricism, but it is related to 
it.  The reductionists were concerned primarily to fit semantics into a scientific 
worldview.  One way (but not the only way) to achieve this would be to show that 
semantic properties reduce to other scientifically respectable properties.  The motivation 
for reductionism is truth empiricism.  If the sciences simply don’t make use of semantic 
properties, then there aren’t any. 
More recently, Michael Devitt has defended truth empiricism in his book Realism 
and Truth,5 and even more recently in “Hilary and Me: Tracking Down Putnam on the 
Realism Issue.”6  One of Devitt’s central claims is that ‘realism’—the thesis that the 
ordinary objects of commonsense (chairs, restaurants, mountains, etc.) and the theoretical 
objects posited by our scientific theories (electrons, gravity waves, the big bang, etc.) 
exist independently of our minds—is “independent of any doctrine of truth…Realism 
does not entail any theory of truth or meaning at all.”  Devitt urges that we should accept 
the ontology of common sense and the natural sciences before asking questions about the 
nature of truth.  He argues that from this starting point we will recognize that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of 
Mind. MIT Press. 
5 Devitt, M. (1990). Realism and Truth, 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press. 
6 Devitt, M. (2013). Hilary and me: Tracking down Putnam on the realism issue. 
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semantically motivated anti-realists like Michael Dummett7 and HIlary Putnam8 are 
confused.  These anti-realists try to subvert the notion of a mind-independent world, 
arguing, on the basis of a priori claims about the nature of truth.  Devitt’s response is that 
a priori claims about the nature of truth have no special bearing on the nature of reality, 
since our epistemic access to the existence and nature of truth is of a piece with our 
epistemic access to the rest of reality. 
If Devitt’s response to semantically motivated anti-realism is on the right track, 
then truth empiricism is the best way to understand our ontological commitment to a truth 
property.  Our scientific practices must not be beholden to any a priori conceptions of 
truth.  It must be taken to be a theoretical, empirical question whether it is possible for 
scientists to give a ‘complete’ theory of the world that does not invoke a notion of truth.  
This means that even the existence of truth must be considered an empirical question, and 
one capable (for all we know antecedently to such an inquiry) of receiving a negative 
answer. 
Despite its naturalistic appeal, truth empiricism is not very widely accepted.  The 
empiricist must confront powerful arguments to the effect that truth must exist regardless 
of what we could discover by doing science.  These arguments attempt to establish on a 
priori grounds that denying the existence of truth implicitly (or explicitly) involves 
accepting a contradiction.  Thus, there is supposed to be an inconsistency in the idea that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Dummett, M. A. E. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press. 
8 See: Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.  Putnam, H. 
(1980). Models and reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.  Putnam, H. 
(1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press. 
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the empirical sciences could lead us to abandon the notion of truth.  Paul Boghossian 
develops one of the most influential and clearly articulated arguments of this kind in his 
essay “The Status of Content.”9  Boghossian argues from a priori premises to the 
conclusion that a metaphysically robust property of truth exists.  The second part of this 
essay will engage Boghossian’s attack on truth empiricism. 
The idea that we might learn there is no property of truth can seem absurd; 
however, the fact that an idea can seem absurd to us now is no reason to think that it 
should not be accepted upon more careful reflection.  Those who espouse a general 
commitment to a scientifically informed ontology are obliged to take truth empiricism 
seriously.  Even if we are currently very confident that truth will be included in any 
plausible scientific worldview, this confidence should not mislead us into thinking that 
we know a priori that scientific practice could never be allowed to convince us 
otherwise. 
In section 1, I will argue that truth empiricism is a plausible epistemological and 
ontological doctrine, and that the existence of truth is open to empirical doubt.  In section 
2, I will show that Boghossian’s a priori argument for the existence of truth fails. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Boghossian, P. (1990). The status of content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84. 
	  
	   6	  





Let us begin with a few clarifications.  First, the doctrine of truth empiricism is 
not to be confused with the claim that if truth exists then it must be possible to reduce 
truth to other scientifically respectable (i.e. naturalistic) properties.  The notion of truth 
may play its own part in our scientific models, in which case we ought to accept its 
existence, even without its being reduced or explained in other terms.  Alternatively, truth 
might find a place in the canons of science by way of a naturalistic reduction, if such a 
reduction is somehow essential or convenient for scientific purposes.  In that case, we 
may take our science to have revealed that truth is identical with some natural relation in 
the same way that chemistry revealed water to be identical with H2O.  (Something like 
this was what Hartry Field predicted in the article mentioned above.)  These possibilities 
are not at issue.  Truth empiricism is merely the doctrine that truth, if it exists, is a 
property of scientific interest; its nature and its existence are open questions to be settled 
through empirical investigation. 
Second, truth empiricism is compatible with the possibility that it is a posteriori 
necessary that truth exists.  This seems rather unlikely as the naturalist currently thinks of 
things, since the only objects that are candidates for being true—thoughts and 
utterances—exist contingently.10  Nevertheless, perhaps the ultimate theory of cosmology 
or quantum entanglement will claim that truth must exist necessarily, either as a self 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a defense of this claim, see: King, J., Soames, S. & Speaks, J. (2014). New 
Thinking About Propositions. Oup Oxford. 
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contained mathematical object or as a property invoked by some fundamental 
mathematical-cum-physical theorem.  Perhaps future cosmologists will tell us that the 
Big Bang followed inexorably from some mathematical proposition that invokes the 
notion of truth.  I cannot now conceive of how we could arrive at such a theory through 
scientific methods, but that does not rule out the possibility that some day our scientists 
will justify our accepting something like it.  Truth empiricism is silent on the matter of 
whether there are a posteriori necessities at all, but it is compatible with truth’s existence 
being one if our best scientific theories say that it is.11 
Third, the truth empiricist can (although they need not) accept that it is a priori 
that truth exists necessarily within the domain of pure mathematics.  Empirical evidence 
can convince us that space is non-Euclidean; however, empirical evidence cannot contest 
the existence of Euclidean space within the domain of pure geometry.  Similarly, the truth 
empiricist is committed to the possibility that empirical evidence could show us that there 
are no truths within space-time, that nothing in nature instantiates the property of truth.  
This is consistent with the claim that empirical evidence cannot force the mathematician 
to abandon a notion of truth.  The truth empiricist might make a special allowance for 
mathematical ontology to be unconstrained by scientific inquiry in the same spirit as the 
geometer’s ontology is counted as unconstrained by observation of events in our actual 
space-time. 
Fourth, truth empiricism is compatible in a certain sense with the claim that the 
existence of truth is contingent but knowable a priori.  We might know about truth in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Of course, if we ultimately abandon the notion of truth, the notion of necessity will 
have to be characterized in some way other than the necessary truth of a sentence. 
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way that we once knew a priori that the meter bar in Paris was one meter long.  By the 
fall of 1875 many physicists had accepted the stipulation that ‘one meter’ was to be 
identified with the length of a particular bar of platinum.  Saul Kripke argued in 1980 that 
we know a priori that this bar is one meter long, yet its length is a contingent feature of 
it.12  In 1983, the meter bar stipulation was abandoned in favor of a new one: the meter is 
now defined as the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a 
second.  Thus, it is no longer a priori knowable that the platinum meter bar is one meter 
long, since it may be (and probably is) slightly longer or shorter than the length of a 
meter as it is currently defined.  Of course, physicists used the old meter bar stipulation to 
reach the point where the speed of light was understood; nevertheless, the old stipulation 
no longer applies today.  Now that the stipulation has been abandoned, what counts as a 
priori knowledge has changed.  What was once a priori knowable qua stipulation is now 
an open empirical question.  (Quine pointed out the possibility that stipulations could lose 
their a priori status in “Carnap and Logical Truth.”13)   
In light of these considerations, we see that the truth empiricist can allow 
sentences to count as true by stipulation.  For instance, T-sentences generated by the 
disquotation schema—“S” is true iff S—can be accepted by the truth empiricist as 
stipulations.  We can know a priori today that there are true sentences in light of these 
stipulations, but this does not constitute a prohibition against the possibility that such 
stipulations can be abandoned in the future as science progresses.  Alternatively, the truth 
empiricist could deny that our stipulations are known a priori at all, instead counting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. 
13 Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Carnap and logical truth. Synthese 12 (4):350--74. 
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them as further theoretical posits with the same status as other scientific hypotheses.  
Either way, it makes sense to count the existence of truth as an open empirical question 
even if we currently accept many T-sentences. 
I said that the truth empiricist could countenance a priori knowledge of 
contingently existing truths only in a certain sense—in the sense that the predicate “is 
true” can be stipulated to hold of certain sentences under certain conditions.  There is 
another sense in which countenancing the contingent existence of truth, as a piece of a 
priori knowledge, is unacceptable to the truth empiricist.  This is the sense in which the 
epistemic status of “Truth exists” is equated to the epistemic status of “I am here now.”  
It is contingent that I am here now, but I know a priori that I am here now.  Similarly, an 
opponent of truth empiricism might hold that truth exists contingently because the 
existence of thinking and speaking beings is contingent, but insist that it is a priori that 
truth exists given our existence as thinking and speaking beings.  To accept that we can 
infer the existence of truth from our existence as thinking, speaking beings is to accept 
that truth is epistemically perspicuous in a way that the rest of scientifically revealed 
reality is not.  To accept that truth’s existence is a priori in this way is to deny that there 
is an open empirical question about the existence of the property of truth. Call this view 
truth rationalism. 
 
1.2. The Prima Facie Argument Against Truth Rationalism 
 
 The prima facie argument against truth rationalism is straightforward: 
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1. We should accept the existence of only those entities and properties postulated 
by our best scientific theories. 
2. Our best scientific theories might not need to postulate the existence of truth.  
3. Therefore, we do not know a priori whether we should accept the existence of 
truth. 
 
Premise 1 is the doctrine of ontological naturalism.14  I will have very little to say 
in its defense beyond its sociological credentials.  Naturalism is the received view in 
contemporary analytic philosophy.  It is the standard of ontology for one who takes 
empirical evidence to be the ultimate arbiter of what we should believe about the world.  
I will assume that premise 1 is accepted without further argument.  Hence, the prima 
facie argument against truth rationalism rests on the plausibility of premise 2.  Why 
should we think premise 2 is plausible? 
Most scientists are very obviously exempt from giving an account of the nature of 
truth in their papers.  They don’t even need to mention the existence of truth.  It is 
possible to write acceptable, comprehensive textbooks on astronomy, physiology, particle 
physics, thermodynamics, medicine, ecology, computer science,15 statistics, climatology, 
geology, geography, economics, biochemistry, quantum mechanics, and many, many 
other empirical subjects without mentioning truth or commenting on its nature. 
 If truth must appear somewhere in the canons of science, we might expect it to 
appear in the textbooks of linguistics or cognitive psychology, since these are the 
domains in which we expect to find an essential recourse to representations.  I will argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The truth empiricist who thinks it is a priori that truth exists as part of mathematics 
needs to formulate the statement of naturalistic ontology more carefully, but there is no 
difficulty in principle.  I suppress the details of this alternative throughout for ease of 
exposition.	  
15 Computer scientists sometimes name Boolean values “true” and “false,” but these 
names can be and are often replaced by the names “1” and “0”.  
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that this development, while plausible, is not necessary; those disciplines could 
conceivably proceed without invoking a notion of truth.  Devitt raises another possibility: 
perhaps the notion of truth will find a place in the science of sociology, in sociological 
explanations concerning the roles that symbols play in our social interactions.  I will 
argue that here, too, the notion of truth is dispensable in principle.  I begin by addressing 
cognitive psychology, then proceed to linguistics, and then address the possibility that 
sociology will need to employ a notion of truth. 
  
1.2.1.  Cognitive Psychology without a Truth Property 
 
 
Working cognitive psychologists do not typically discuss the nature of truth or the 
role it might play in their models.  However, Jerry Fodor has argued that psychologists 
working with computational models of cognition are committed to the claim that mental 
states are relations to internal formulae—sentences in a ‘language of thought’ that are 
somehow encoded within the brain—and that these sentences must have both syntactic 
and semantic features in order for the computational models to be any good.16  The 
semantic features of LOT sentences are to include truth-conditions and, often enough, 
those sentences are supposed to instantiate the property of truth.  If the best cognitive 
psychology must posit internal mental formulae that have truth conditions and are 
sometimes true, then there is no prospect for a complete future science without truth and 
truth empiricism ought to be abandoned.  I will argue that this is not the case—cognitive 
psychology is not required to employ a notion of truth. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See: Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. and 
Fodor J. (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press. 
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The first thing to notice is that the kind of computational psychology that requires 
a language of thought is not the only research program available in the current science of 
cognition.  Connectionist approaches to cognition model the activities of the brain by 
describing neural networks and their activation patterns, rather than by postulating a 
discrete ontology of internal formulae with semantic properties.  If theories from the 
connectionist paradigm ultimately prove to be the better science of cognition, then 
Fodor’s arguments for the imperative inclusion of truth within cognitive psychology will 
not matter. 
But even if the best science ultimately posits the existence of a language of 
thought and identifies mental processes with computations performed over LOT 
sentences, these sentences need not be understood as having truth conditions.  
Computational operations are defined using syntactic properties alone.  One can program 
a computer using only meaningless strings.  Likewise, computational models of cognition 
that postulate a language of thought may treat our mental states as relations to 
uninterpreted strings whose roles in the cognitive economy are determined by their 
syntactic properties alone.  Since semantic properties can be left out of a computational 
model altogether, computational models of cognition are not required to make use of a 
truth property.17 
 
1.2.1.1.  Concerning Inferential-Role Semantics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Stephen Stich made this observation in Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to 
Cognitive Science. MIT Press. 
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If this picture is right, then it is possible to develop a model of cognition in which 
there are internal sentences that have computational roles within the cognitive system but 
which have no semantic properties.  However, some philosophers claim that the 
computational role of a sentence is sufficient to determine its semantic content.  This is 
the view known as ‘inferential-role semantics.’18  Take an arbitrary symbol ⊗.  Suppose 
that the following rules hold: you can infer P from P⊗Q, you can infer Q from P⊗Q, and 
if you already accept P and you already accept Q, you can infer P⊗Q.  These rules suffice 
to identify the semantic properties of the symbol ⊗--it has the same semantics as the 
word “and.”  The idea of inferential-role semantics is that, like ⊗, all words in a given 
language get their semantic properties in virtue of the inferences they feature in.  Because 
the truth conditions of sentences are determined by their syntactic structure plus the 
semantic properties of their basic constituents, inferential-role semantics will assign 
truth-values to sentences on the basis of the inferences their constituent parts enter into.  
A proponent of this type of semantics might therefore object to the idea that a model 
could assign computational roles to sentences without thereby assigning semantic 
properties, including truth, to those sentences. 
In reply to this worry, I should first point out that there has never been much 
success deriving the semantic properties of any significant fragment of a language from 
the inferential properties of that fragment alone.  We thus have little reason to believe that 
such a project will be part of any future science.  But more importantly, whether or not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Block, N. (1986). Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.  
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inferential-role semantics appears as part of some future scientific theory is itself an 
empirical question.  As noted in section 1.1, truth empiricism allows that scientific 
inquiry might convince us that semantic properties like truth supervene on, reduce to, or 
turn out on a posteriori grounds to be identical with some other properties.  Inferential-
role semantics, if correct, would amount to a scientifically licensed reduction of 
semantics to syntactic properties.  This does not pose a challenge to truth empiricism. 
 
1.2.1.2. Concerning Validity 
A more pressing objection to the truth empiricist: if our cognitive psychology is to 
model our logical abilities, it must provide an explanation of our capacity to recognize 
valid arguments and employ valid reasoning.  But validity is a matter of truth 
preservation—an argument is valid just in case the truth of the premises guarantees the 
truth of the conclusion.  How then could there be a cognitive psychology that doesn’t take 
account of truth?  This objection has more force than the objection from inferential-role 
semantics, since it purports to show that any complete cognitive psychology must include 
a notion of truth. 
There are two distinct worries about first-order validity for the truth empiricist.  
First, how can we explain our ability to recognize first-order valid arguments without 
positing a notion of truth?  Second, how do we explain our ability to reason validly in 
first-order logic without positing a notion of truth?  The truth empiricist’s task is to show 
that it is (or at least might be) possible to explain our ability to sort out valid arguments 
from invalid arguments without including a truth property as part of the explanation and 
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then to show how the arguments we classify as ‘valid’ are produced by the human 
cognitive system, again without invoking a notion of truth. 
So, is it possible to explain our ability to recognize valid arguments without 
positing a notion of truth?  Although we say that valid arguments are the ones that 
preserve truth from premises to conclusion, the relation that needs to hold between the set 
of premises and the conclusion in order for an argument to count as valid—in first order 
logic—is a syntactic relation.  It is necessary and sufficient for an argument to be first-
order valid that the conclusion can be derived from the premises via a finite number of 
applications of inference rules, and these inference rules are defined according to the 
syntax of the language.  The validity of an argument does not depend on the semantics of 
the sentences involved.  It is therefore possible to describe a machine that recognizes 
first-order valid arguments without invoking a notion of truth. 
A truth rationalist might continue to press.  There are many syntactically 
definable inference rules that do not preserve truth.  The rationalist might demand an 
explanation of why humans pay special attention to the inference rules that constitute 
first-order validity rather than some other set of rules that fail to preserve truth.  In other 
words, how can we explain why we treat valid arguments as special without adverting to 
a notion of truth? 
This question poses a problem for the truth empiricist only if there is nothing 
special about valid arguments that might explain our interest in them aside from the fact 
that they preserve truth from premises to conclusion.  But this is not the case, as valid 
arguments are useful and interesting for all sorts of reasons.  Take, for example, an agent 
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who accepts the sentences “That fence is electrified” and “If that fence is electrified, then 
I should avoid touching it” and who also accepts standard first-order inference rules.  
This agent will derive the sentence “I should avoid touching that fence.”  Assuming that 
the fence is in fact electrified, the agent is much better off having made the inference they 
did.  Compare a different agent who starts with the same first two sentences, but who 
accepts an invalid inference rule: If P then Q, P, therefore Not-Q.  This agent will get 
electrocuted.  Clearly, employing the first sort of inference rule is a better strategy.  The 
truth empiricist can reply to the rationalist along these lines, i.e. that our interest in what 
we typically classify as valid arguments might be best explained ultimately in terms of 
successful strategies. 
Do we need a notion of truth to explain why one strategy is more successful than 
another?  In general this is not the case.  In chess, one relatively successful strategy is to 
trade a knight for a queen whenever possible; a relatively unsuccessful strategy is to trade 
a queen for a knight whenever possible.  The best explanation of the relative strengths of 
these strategies does not need to mention truth.  It only needs to mention the benefits 
conferred by certain types of behavior under certain types of circumstances.  The same 
might plausibly hold of cognitive strategies.  The fact that using valid inference rules 
contributes to the organism’s success under various circumstances might be best 
explained by mentioning the benefits that tend to be produced by those cognitive 
behaviors under various kinds of circumstances. 
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So there seems to be no special problem for truth empiricism stemming from our 
ability to recognize valid arguments.  What about our ability to reason validly?  Can we 
explain this ability without invoking a notion of truth? 
The first thing to note is that our modern conception of a valid argument was not 
developed with any high degree of precision or perspicuity until Gottlieb Frege wrote the 
Begriffsschrift.19  The second thing to note is that humans require a great deal of training 
and instruction to be able to reason validly—this usually involves taking a course at the 
college level to obtain even a minimal degree of mastery.  Far from being part of our 
nature as rational beings, the human’s ability to construct valid arguments is the product 
of ingenuity and a lot of training at the use of the predicate calculus.  If the invention of 
the predicate calculus and the process of learning how to use it can be implemented on a 
computer, then these achievements can be modeled in purely syntactic terms.  It is surely 
an open empirical question whether or not this implementation can be achieved, so it is 
an open empirical question whether truth will feature in the explanation of our ability to 
reason validly. 
The fact that logicians take themselves to be working out the truth-values of 
sentences is no reason to think that the best explanation of what they are actually doing 
will mention the notion of truth.  Psychoanalysts take themselves to be detecting and 
relieving conflicts within the subconscious depths of their patients, but of course that is 
no reason in itself to suppose that people really do suffer from conflicts residing in the 
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depths of their subconscious.  Future psychologists might reject the existence of truth-
values just as surely as contemporary psychologists might reject the reality of Freudian 
neuroses. 
What about higher-order inference?  Consider the second-order inference from 
“Derek weighs more than 5 kilograms” and “Melissa weighs more than 5 kilograms” to 
“There is some property that Derek and Melissa share.”  We naturally consider this to be 
a valid inference, but it is a corollary of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem that second-
order logic does not admit of a complete proof theory.  There is no way to give a 
completely syntactic account of second-order validity.  We could characterize the validity 
of this inference using a model-theoretic definition according to which an inference is 
valid just in case every model of the premises is a model of the conclusion, but that seems 
to require introducing a notion of truth-in-a-model.  If model theory is the only way to 
capture higher-order validity, and if our cognitive psychology must explain our 
judgments of higher-order validity, what can the truth empiricist say? 
 First, since there are only finitely many second-order inference schemas that we 
recognize as valid, we can treat these schema as primitive inference rules in our 
psychology.  We can (trivially) specify their syntactic form.  Therefore, we can give a 
fully syntactic account of all of the second-order inference rules we in fact accept. 
Alternatively, the truth empiricist can make the case that model theory as it is 
currently understood can be interpreted without a notion of truth.  According to the 
model-theoretic approach to validity, an inference is valid just in case every model of the 
premises is a model of the conclusion.  What is a model, and what does it mean for 
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something to be a model of a set of sentences?  Usually these notions are understood 
either in mathematical terms or in terms of a correspondence relation between an 
organism and its environment broadly construed—i.e. the universe.  The mathematical 
understanding sees models as abstract entities; each model is an ordered pair consisting 
of a domain—a set of abstract objects—and an interpretation function that maps terms in 
the language to objects in the domain, n-place predicates to n-tuples of objects in the 
domain, and which maps function symbols to functions defined in the domain.  Truth in a 
model is defined recursively according to the syntax of the language as a function of the 
interpretations of the syntactic constituents of well-formed formulas.  The 
correspondence understanding works in just the same way except that the domain of the 
model consists of objects in the actual universe. 
The truth empiricist should point out that these are not the only ways to 
understand what model-theoretic semantics is about.  In the ultimate science of cognition, 
models might be understood as internal representations, parts of the cognitive economy 
posited by cognitive psychologists in addition to LOT sentences in order to explain the 
behaviors of cognitive agents.  In principle, the domains of our internal models could be 
‘generated’ by a syntactically specified program in just the same way that a domain of 
videogame characters can be generated by a set of syntactic strings in the computer 
programming language.  Our LOT sentences can then be ‘interpreted’ according to these 
internal models, and this interpretation function can be treated as a syntactic operation 
performed within the agent itself.  The internal models constructed by the agent can be 
modified according to the sentences they accept.  The result is a fully syntactic 
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characterization of contemporary model theory for the language of thought, where the 
‘semantic’ interpretation of LOT sentences is given by a syntactic object, a computer 
generated model, ‘inside the head’ of the cognitive agent. 
What now of the claim that modeling second-order inference will force cognitive 
psychology to adopt a notion of truth?  Consider again our example of a second-order 
inference.  Upon accepting the sentence “Derek weighs more than 5 kilograms,” the 
domain of the agent’s internal model acquires a new individual and that individual is 
included in the ‘extension’ of the predicate “weighs more than 5 kilograms.”  Another 
individual is added upon accepting “Melissa weighs more than 5 kilograms,” and that 
individual is similarly included in the ‘extension’ of that predicate.  These individuals are 
just entities inside the generated model inside the agent’s head.  Each of these generation 
operations, since they can be implemented on a computer, admits of a completely 
syntactic description.  We can also give a completely syntactic description of a program 
that decides whether any predicate of the system’s language of thought has an extension 
to which both of these two individuals belong.  Using this program, the agent’s cognitive 
system checks and affirms that the inference holds.  Thus, the judgment of second-order 
validity can be modeled without invoking a notion of truth.  Whether the best cognitive 
psychology will pursue something like this kind of syntactic explanation is an open 
empirical question, but clearly there is a possibility that truth will not be essential to the 
best explanation of second-order inference.  Even if something very similar to 
contemporary model theory is the right way to do semantics, that does not guarantee that 
truth will feature in any scientific explanations. 
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1.2.1.3.  Representing the Environment 
Even if our inference practices can be modeled without invoking a truth property, 
how can the cognitive psychologist hope to address the relation between organism and 
environment without invoking a notion of truth?  After all, what good is cognition if the 
organism is unable to arrive at true beliefs about the environment? 
Certainly any adequate theory of cognition must explain the relation between 
organism and environment.  Truth empiricism cannot be accepted if that explanation must 
posit the existence of a truth property.  I’ll argue there is no such requirement.  The 
relation between organism and environment might be best understood in terms of truth, 
but it also might ultimately be explained some other way.  I will describe an alternative to 
a truth-based understanding according to which the cognitive relations between organism 
and environment are modeled in terms of Shannon information, and show why such a 
theory does not need a notion of truth. 
Claude Shannon expressly disavows that the theory of information needs a notion 
of truth in the second paragraph of his famous essay “A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication.”20  There he writes 
Frequently [messages] have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some 
system with certain physical or conceptual entities.  These semantic aspects of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.21 
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21 Loc. Cit. pp. 379. 
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Shannon’s theory of information is a description of the mathematical properties of 
systems that are connected in a way that makes it possible to send signals from one 
system to the other.  The states of the systems and the signals that are sent between them 
are not given semantic interpretations.  The theory does not require that the states or the 
signals have truth-values, truth conditions, or any other semantic content.   
The kind of theory I have in mind treats the relation between organism and 
environment as an instance of what Shannon calls a ‘communication system.’  The 
environment is treated as the information source—it generates ‘messages’ from a stock of 
possible messages.  The possible messages are just possible states of the environment.  
What it is for the environment to generate a message at a given time is just for it to be in 
one of its possible states at that time.  Messages are generated according to a probability 
distribution determined by the past and the laws of nature (in the usual way).  The stock 
of possible messages is allowed to be infinite and continuous but can also be modeled as 
finite and discrete (if, for instance, only a subset of the possible states of the environment 
are interesting to the cognitive scientist in some context, or if the organism can only 
detect a finite number of states of the environment).  The messages that can be received 
by the organism are those that can be encoded in some physical medium—a sound wave, 
a stream of photons, a chemical compound, etc.  The physical medium is the channel of 
the communication system; it carries the signal, which is the output of a function that 
maps possible messages into possible states of the channel.  According to Shannon’s 
template, a signal is encoded in the channel via the operation of a transmitter.  In the 
physical environment, transmitters are the events that produce signals in the appropriate 
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media, e.g. the event of an array of photons being emitted from the surfaces of objects in 
the visual field.  Transmitters implement or realize the function from messages into states 
of the channel.  The organism’s sense organs are the receivers.  A receiver performs the 
inverse operation of the transmitter.  A receiver is an implementation of a function from 
states of the channel into states of the destination organism.  The organism must have a 
distinct state for every distinct message it can receive.  By receiving messages, the state 
of the organism co-varies with the state of the environment.  
Starting from this basic framework, the organism’s connection to its environment 
can be investigated as a puzzle about how the organism makes use of various signal-
bearing channels to receive messages from the environment, how its sense organs 
implement a function that inverts the operation of the transmission events, and how it 
makes use of its own internal states to efficiently encode incoming messages.  Shannon 
identifies the average amount of information generated by the environment as the entropy 
H of a random variable that ranges over the possible messages that the environment could 
generate, where each possible message is associated with a probability pi of its occurring 
and H is determined by multiplying each pi by log (pi) and summing all the products 
together.  H represents the highest average amount of information the organism can 
receive from the environment.  Understanding whether, and how, the organism manages 
to maximize its information uptake is a reverse engineering problem.  Shannon’s theory 
provides the mathematical tools to model the efficiency of the organism’s internal ‘code’ 
for receiving messages, the amount of noise present in the channel, and many more 
	   24	  
aspects of the situation.  (This brief summary doesn’t even scratch the surface of a full 
information-theoretic account of the organism-environment relation.)   
Most important for our purposes: a theory that describes these various aspects of 
the organism-environment connection does not need to mention truth or content, even if 
the organism uses LOT sentences to handle and organize incoming messages from the 
environment.  The organism’s LOT sentences will carry information concerning the state 
of the environment, but those sentences do not need to be assigned semantic contents nor 
need they ever be counted as true for the theory to deliver informative explanations of 
what is going on.  Moreover, Shannon information relations between organism and 
environment by themselves are insufficient to ground a theory of content.  This fact is 
clearly articulated by Fred Dretske in his book Knowledge and the Flow of Information.22  
The problem is that internal states are promiscuous concerning what they carry 
information about.  Each internal state of the organism carries information about many 
different incompatible states of the environment at once, in the sense that each internal 
state is associated with non-zero probabilities of many different incompatible messages.  
The atomic LOT sentence Fa in a given cognitive system might carry information about 
the presence of a stain on the rug, the mood of the agent’s mother, the time of day, the 
fact that the agent’s little sister spilled paint, the possibility that the agent’s little brother 
spilled paint, the fact that the agent’s cognitive system is functioning properly, the 
possibility that it’s not, and so on and on.  The fact that a LOT sentence S in the cognitive 
economy of an organism carries Shannon information does not entail that S expresses a 
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proposition.  Thus, not only are contents and truth-values not required by a theory that 
treats the organism-environment relation as a communication system; that relation does 
not support a reductive analysis of truth or content. 
This completes the case in favor of truth empiricism in the cognitive domain.  I’ve 
argued that there are prospects for constructing psychological theories of rational 
inference and of our ability to represent the environment without positing a truth 
property.  Since it is an open empirical question whether our best theories in cognitive 
psychology will follow the approaches I’ve sketched, it is also an empirical question 
whether a notion of truth will be part of such theories. 
 
1.2.2. Linguistics without a Truth Property 
 
 
The other likely place to find a requirement placed on the sciences to include a 
notion of truth is within the science of linguistics.  In this section, I address the question 
of whether linguistics must posit a truth property.  I will argue that it need not. 
As in the last section, the first thing to note in connection with this issue is that 
there are approaches to linguistics that do not invoke a notion of truth.  Researchers in 
Noam Chomsky’s minimalist program attempt to give explanations of all linguistic 
phenomena without doing any semantics at all.23  There are also versions of process-
oriented dynamic semantics where the ‘meanings’ of declarative sentences are identified 
as programming statements of an imperative programming language.  According to these 
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theories, declarative sentences instruct the cognitive system to perform an action. A truth 
property plays no role in either of these approaches.  Since it is an open question whether 
one of these approaches will ultimately be vindicated by empirical evidence, it is also an 
open empirical question whether truth will appear in our more advanced theories of 
linguistics. 
The truth empiricist can also draw on the arguments given in the previous section 
to support the claim that linguists are not required to posit truth.  Since linguistic behavior 
is a species of intelligent behavior, it is reasonable to expect that a complete cognitive 
psychology could in principle provide a complete explanation of linguistic behavior.  If 
the considerations raised in the last section are correct, future cognitive science might not 
employ a notion of truth.  Thus, it is possible that someday linguistics will be reduced to 
a semantics-free cognitive psychology. 
 Detractors of truth empiricism might insist that linguistics has a special obligation 
to account for data about truth, that the existence of true sentences is just part of what the 
theory is required to explain.  The objection goes: linguistics cannot deny the existence of 
truth any more than meteorology can deny the existence of weather; to do so would be to 
abandon the science altogether. 
 I think the analogy between linguistics and meteorology breaks down precisely 
because weather is directly observable but truth is not.  It may be commonsensical that 
there are true sentences, but this is not because it is immediately apparent that some 
sentences are true in the same way that it is immediately apparent that there is weather.  If 
you ask a person to say what a cloud is, what rain and wind are, they can just point.  If 
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you ask a person to say what truth is, they will sputter.  They might produce some 
examples of true sentences, but they cannot demonstrate the truth property itself.  This is 
not the case for all properties; the property of being red can be demonstrated.  Unlike 
clouds and the property of being red, which may be observed, truth is a theoretical 
property that we assign to thoughts and sentences as part of an explanatory project.  Truth 
is not part of the data to be explained. 
 One last objection that I will consider comes from Barbara Partee, or at least I 
thought of it while reading her work on the syntax-semantics interface.24  Partee discusses 
what she calls the division of labor between syntax and semantics.  A given linguistic 
puzzle might be intractable as a puzzle as approached by syntacticians, but might be 
relatively easy to resolve when considered from the point of view of semantics.  This 
situation testifies to the existence of semantic properties, inter alia truth, for how else 
could there be a way of solving linguistic puzzles that resist syntactic analysis? 
Although there may be a real issue about whether a given puzzle belongs to 
syntax or semantics, it seems equally possible that recasting syntactic puzzles as semantic 
ones might someday be seen as a sort of buck-passing.  Provided that there really are 
semantic properties, it makes sense to assume that some puzzles that appear to be issues 
in the theory of syntax might turn out to be semantic in nature, and that we could make 
progress by recognizing such cases and working on them in the appropriate domain.  But 
the fact that people currently take themselves to be solving problems in syntax by giving 
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semantic theories does not guarantee that these solutions will hold up when more is 
understood.  It does not give us anything like an a priori reason to believe that semantic 
properties must exist.  At best, it gives us some evidence that they do exist, but this is 
compatible with the ultimate rejection of a truth property by linguists when more 
evidence is accounted for.   Thus, the question of truth in linguistics remains open. 
 
 
1.3. Sociology without a Truth Property 
 
 
Devitt claims that posting truth helps us make sense of the ways in which 
members of a society use their symbols.  Might it be the case that sociology must make 
use of a truth property?  It seems not. 
Sociology textbooks do not typically invoke a notion of truth.  There is no explicit 
use for such a concept in most sociology theories.  Theories of social stratification, class, 
social mobility, sexuality, religion—these do not seem to need to posit a truth property.  
If any part of social theory must make use of a notion of truth, perhaps it is in the theory 
of law.  Whether or not someone is telling the truth is of critical significance in 
courtroom settings.  However, whatever the proper courtroom behavior is, there should 
not be a special problem characterizing it in the terms of psychology and linguistics.  
Assuming that both psychology and linguistics can in principle be pursued without 
positing the existence of truth, the possibility that legal theory might follow suit is a clear 
empirical possibility. 
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Beyond studying the law, why should sociology have special need of such a 
property?  Presumably cognitive psychology will explain why people act the way they do 
in the presence of certain utterances—e.g. why the people get angry when the president 
declares war.  Linguistics will characterize the languages spoken in various cultures.  
What in sociology is left to explain that might require truth?  I can think of nothing. 
This completes the prima facie argument for truth empiricism.  It is an open 
empirical question whether any advanced science will posit the existence of truth, so 
given a naturalistic approach to ontology, it is an open empirical question whether truth 
exists.  In the next section, I engage with an argument intended to show that this 
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In the closing paragraph of “The Status of Content,” Boghossian summarizes his 
argument thus: 
Much as Descartes’s cogito argument may be understood to have shown that I cannot 
make sense of the suggestion that I do not exist, by showing that the claim that I do exist 
is a presupposition of the most refined attempt to deny that I do; so the present argument 
should be understood as showing that we cannot make sense of the claim that our 
thoughts and utterances do not possess robust truth conditions by showing that the claim 
that they do possess robust truth conditions is a presupposition of the most refined 
attempt to deny that they do. 
 
The truth empiricist must reply.  Much as David Hume’s empirical search for the 
self—the presupposition that such a search could possibly be fruitful—challenged the 
conclusion of Descartes’s cogito, so the doctrine of truth empiricism challenges the 
conclusion of Boghossian’s argument.  If the existence and nature of truth are to be 
treated as open empirical questions, then it must be possible for science to reveal that no 
thought and no utterance has the property of being true.25  Boghossian’s argument 
opposes this possibility by purporting to show that some sentences must have ‘robust’ 
(not merely deflationary) truth conditions, from which it follows that some sentences are 
true and that the predicate “is true” denotes a property.  In this section, I critically engage 
Boghossian’s argument and show that it falls well short of deciding the issue against truth 
empiricism. 
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Boghossian begins his argument for the existence of robust truth conditions with a 
consideration about what is necessary for an “irrealist conception of a given region of 
discourse.”  In order to deny that anything is F, Boghossian tells us, we must hold one of 
two positions:  
 ERROR:  The predicate “F” denotes a property that nothing instantiates. 
  FAILURE:  The predicate “F” fails to denote a property.  
I pause to register the fact that, by setting up the debate over the existence of truth 
within the framework of the linguistic turn, Boghossian has already taken the high 
ground.  By accepting that ERROR and FAILURE exhaust the options for the truth 
empiricist, we are agreeing to debate the existence of truth by debating about the 
extension of the predicate “is true.”  We are agreeing to presuppose that a debate over 
what exists is really a debate within semantics.  This is precisely the thesis that Michael 
Devitt urges us to resist on truth empiricist grounds!  Moreover, the notion of a 
predicate’s extension is part of semantics and is very closely related to the notion of a 
truth-value.  An atomic sentence Fx is true iff the object picked out by x is in the 
extension of the predicate F.  The intelligibility of the notion of an extension in the 
absence of truth is questionable.  This close connection between extension and truth 
might reasonably lead us to suspect that a question or two has been begged from the 
outset.  I will return to these considerations after dealing with Boghossian’s argument on 
its own terms. 
Suppose for now that one who denies the existence of Fs must be an ERROR 
theorist or a FAILURE theorist concerning the predicate “F.”  Boghossian argues that 
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neither of these are consistent options when it comes to denying the existence of non-
deflationary truth conditions, so non-deflationary truth conditions must exist.  A direct 
corollary of his a priori argument is that some sentences are true. 
Boghossian’s argument against the ERROR theorist is relatively straightforward.  
If you are an ERROR theorist about truth conditions, then you hold that for all P the 
predicate “has truth condition P” denotes a property which nothing instantiates.26  The 
extension of “has truth condition P” is therefore empty, so all atomic sentences of the 
form “x has truth condition P” must be false.  By the disquotational property of the truth 
predicate, “x has truth condition P” is true iff x has truth condition P.  It follows that no 
sentence has a truth condition.27  But sentences can only be false if they have truth 
conditions, so according to the ERROR theorist, no sentences are false.  Therefore, the 
ERROR theorist must hold that all sentences of the form “x has truth condition P” are 
false and also not false.  This is a contradiction, so the ERROR theory about truth 
conditions can’t be right.28 
The argument is contentious at least in its use of the ‘disquotational property of 
the truth predicate,’ which presupposes that bivalence holds for every sentence in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 P is a substitutional variable that ranges over sentences.  Following Boghossian, I 
freely make use of substitutional quantification throughout. 
 
28 Technically, it is not a contradiction unless we add the claim that sentences of the 
relevant form exist.  If there are no sentences of the form “x has truth condition P,” then 
the ERROR theorist is not committed to anything being both false and not false.  To deny 
that there are such sentences would be bizarre (by our current lights, at any rate) but the 
logical possibility is left open.	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language.  An irrealist following Michael Dummett would reject this assumption,29 and 
therefore would reject Boghossian’s argument at this point. 
So, some sentence of the form “x has truth condition P” must be true, unless (for 
all P) the predicate “has truth condition P” fails to denote a property, in which case all 
such sentences will lack a truth-value entirely.  Therefore, we know a priori that some 
truth exists (something is true) unless FAILURE is the correct account of the predicate 
“has truth condition P.”  Boghossian’s next argument aims to show that accepting 
FAILURE also involves accepting a contradiction.  This argument is significantly more 
complex. 
Boghossian begins with the observation that (according to our most widely 
accepted truth-conditional semantic theories!) if a predicate F fails to denote a property, 
then any atomic sentence Fx will fail to have any truth conditions.  A FAILURE theorist 
about truth conditions says that the predicate “has truth condition P” fails to denote a 
property, and so must be committed to 
LACK:  All atomic sentences of the form “S has truth condition P” 
lack truth conditions. 
 
Boghossian also argues that if the predicate “has truth condition P” fails to denote 
a property, then so too must the predicate “true” fail to denote a property.  He says: 
“[Since] the truth value of a sentence is fully determined by its truth conditions and the 
relevant worldly facts…there is no way…that a sentence’s possessing a truth value could 
be a thoroughly factual matter (“true” does express a property) if there is non-factuality in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Michael Dummett (1973). The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic. In , Truth 
and Other Enigmas. Duckworth. 215--247. 
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one of its determinants (“has truth condition p” does not express a property).”30  The idea 
here is that if there are no truth conditions, there is no way for a sentence to be true.  
Hence, according to Boghossian, a FAILURE theorist is also committed to 
TRUELESS:  “true” does not denote a property. 
So FAILURE-type irrealism about truth conditions supposedly entails both 
LACK and TRUELESS.  But, Boghossian claims, LACK and TRUELESS are 
incompatible: LACK implies the negation of TRUELESS.  Thus, FAILURE implies a 
contradiction: “true” does and does not denote a property.  Together with the result of the 
earlier argument, this entails that there must be some true sentence of the form “x has 
truth condition P.”   
Why should we think that LACK implies the negation of TRUELESS?  
Boghossian argues from the following three claims: 
NONFACTUAL: LACK constitutes non-factualism about a certain 
domain of discourse, viz. sentences that ascribe 
truth conditions. 
 
DEFLATED: TRUELESS entails some deflationary account of 
truth.   
 
PANFACTUALISM:  Deflationary accounts of truth are incompatible with 
non-factualism about any domain of discourse. 
 
Boghossian defines non-factualism about a given domain of discourse D as the 
claim that sentences in D lack truth conditions.  A domain of discourse is a collection of 
sentences that all use some definitive predicate(s).  For instance, you might define the 
domain of moral discourse as the collection of sentences that are constituted in part by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Boghossian, op. cit. pp. 175, parentheses in original. 
	   35	  
the predicate “is good.”  LACK is the claim that sentences in the domain of discourse 
defined by predicates of the form “has truth condition P” lack truth conditions; so 
NONFACTUAL is guaranteed by definition. 
Thus, whether FAILURE really implies a contradiction depends on the status of 
DEFLATED and PANFACTUALISM.  Granting the rest of Boghossian’s argument 
(including his controversial starting point), the viability of truth empiricism depends on 
the plausibility of rejecting either one or both of DEFLATED and PANFACTUALISM. 
 I will argue against both of these claims in a moment, but first I pause to flag a 
serious error in Boghossian’s argument against content irrealism.  The error is not 
directly of use to the truth empiricist, but it is devastating to Boghossian’s claim to have 
shown that irrealism about truth conditions is incoherent.  The problem concerns the 
argument deriving TRUELESS from the claim that the predicate “has truth condition P” 
fails to denote a property.  This argument fails unless one is already committed to the 
idea that a true sentence necessarily possesses an additional aspect beyond its truth, a 
content that determines its truth-value under various possible circumstances.  But the idea 
that a true sentence must have some additional property—some content—in order for it to 
be true is not compulsory.  A proponent of extensional logic in the mold of Quine readily 
rejects the idea that sentences are to be associated with functions from conditions (e.g. 
states of affairs, situations, possibilities, etc.) to truth-values, yet such a Quinean need not 
accept that “true” fails to have an extension.  The extensionalist may count sentences as 
true and false but reject proprietary truth conditions as creatures of darkness.  A Quinean 
extensionalist might be happy say that a true sentence is a member of the class of all true 
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sentences, and thus happy to count all true sentences as the non-proprietary truth 
conditions of any true sentence.  The creature of darkness is a special property of a 
sentence that gives it distinct truth conditions from every other true sentence, and the 
Quinean extensionalist denies that these special properties exist.	  	  Along related lines, 
another kind of Quinean might hold that the only bearers of truth—the only things “is 
true” may be correctly predicated of—are whole theories.  Such a Quinean might reject 
the claim that sentences have truth conditions, yet maintain that many theories are true.  
These two Quinean positions show that it is logically possible to accept LACK without 
accepting TRUELESS.  Therefore, it is possible to maintain that there is a property of 
truth without accepting that there are such things as truth conditions.  As Boghossian 
takes care to insist, “the essential core of the ordinary notion of content does consist 
simply in the idea of a truth condition [.]”  Hence, the fact that he fails to show a 
contradiction in the prospect of abandoning our commitment to truth conditions leaves 
the status of content very much up in the air.	  
 However, these considerations do not alleviate the concerns of the truth empiricist 
who wants to argue that TRUELESS is not ruled out a priori.  The truth empiricist must 
show that there is no contradiction implicit in accepting that “true” fails to denote a 
property.  Moreover, if sentences do have truth conditions, then some sentence of the 
form “S has truth condition P” will be true, so the truth empiricist must also accept that 
LACK is consistent with TRUELESS.  So Boghossian’s argument must be confronted; 
the truth empiricist must rule out either DEFLATED or PANFACTUALISM.   
	   37	  
I will argue that both may be rejected.  I will begin with a discussion of 
PANFACTUALISM.  According to PANFACTUALISM, deflationary theories of truth 
are incompatible with non-factualism about any domain of discourse.  Why should this be 
so? 
Deflationary theories of truth are so-called because they eschew the need for a 
theory of truth that includes more than the set of T-sentences for a given language.  T-
sentences are sentences formed by substituting sentences from a certain class, known as 
the ‘substitution class,’ for the letter S in the schema: “S” is true if and only if S.  The 
deflationist thinks nothing else is required to grasp the notion of truth beyond accepting 
the correct set of T-sentences.  The theory of truth just is the correct set of T-sentences.  
Which set of T-sentences is the correct one?  The correct set includes all and only the T-
sentences formed by substituting the meaningful declarative sentences of the language 
under investigation.  Hence, the theory of truth for English should include “Snow is 
white” is true iff snow is white, but not “Is snow white?” is true iff is snow white? 
since that sentence is not declarative, and not “The nothing noths” is true iff the 
nothing noths because that sentence is not meaningful. 
Why should deflationary theories of truth rule out every form of non-factualism?  
Recall that non-factualism about domain D is defined as the claim that sentences of D 
lack truth-conditions.  Boghossian claims that deflationary theories of truth automatically 
assign truth-conditions to every meaningful declarative sentence.  Every sentence “S” in 
every domain of discourse is to be understood as having a truth condition given by: “S” is 
true iff S.  There cannot be a domain of discourse the sentences of which lack truth 
	   38	  
conditions.  Therefore, Boghossian concludes, deflationary theories entail that non-
factualism cannot be correct for any domain of discourse. 
The problem with this argument is that deflationary theories (as characterized) 
rely on an unanalyzed and unexplained notion of ‘meaningfulness.’31  Since only the 
meaningful declarative sentences of a language are included in the substitution class that 
defines the correct set of T-sentences for the truth theory of that language, only 
meaningful declarative sentences are automatically assigned truth conditions by the 
deflationary theory.  It is thus open to the non-factualist about truth conditions to claim 
that sentences employing predicates of the form “has truth condition P” are not 
meaningful, and do not feature in any of the language’s truth-definitive T-sentences.  
Deflationary truth theorists who are proponents of other brands of non-factualism can 
claim that sentences in the domain they suspect of being non-factual are also 
meaningless.  For example, Boghossian accuses A. J. Ayer of endorsing this 
inconsistency.  Ayer holds both a deflationary theory of truth and endorses non-
factualism about the predicate “good,” so according to Boghossian, Ayer must be 
inconsistent.  But Ayer also endorses an empiricist criterion of significance that is 
explicitly meant to count moral claims as meaningless, so presumably Ayer would deny 
that sentences employing the predicate “good” should feature in the theory of truth. 
One would surely expect a proponent of a FAILURE theory of the predicate “has 
truth conditions” to treat sentences composed of that predicate as meaningless.  In order 
to block this reply, Boghossian would need to add a claim to the effect that sentences 
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using predicates of the form “has truth condition P” are meaningful, but given the 
connection between being meaningful and having truth conditions, this additional claim 
might properly be ignored as question-begging.  Thus, the truth empiricist is warranted in 
rejecting PANFACTUALISM. 
The truth empiricist can also rule out DEFLATED.  Boghossian claims that 
accepting TRUELESS forces one to accept a deflationary theory of truth, but why should 
that be so?  According to the truth empiricist, it is an open question whether even the T-
sentences will be part of our best scientific theories.  From the empiricist point of view, 
the possibility that there is no truth is akin to the possibility that there is no phlogiston.  
We don’t need a deflationary theory of phlogiston; we don’t need any theory of 
phlogiston.  Likewise, the truth empiricist thinks that we might not need any theory of 
truth.  It is therefore not the case that denying the existence of truth commits us to a 
deflationary theory of truth, so DEFLATED may be rejected too. 
At this point, it should be clear that Boghossian’s argument fails on its own terms.  
What about Boghossian’s starting position?  Must the truth empiricist agree that the only 
viable options for a truth irrealist are ERROR and FAILURE?  I think not. 
Recall, Boghossian thinks that a debate over the existence of Fs must be 
understood as a debate about the extension of the predicate “F.”  Framing the debate 
about truth conditions in this way leads us close to contradiction (although, as we saw, 
there is really no contradiction involved in denying that “has truth condition P” has an 
extension), but must the debate be conducted in terms of predicate extensions?  In our 
discussion of DEFLATED, we touched on the possibility of casting the issue in a 
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different light.  If we accept ontological naturalism—the claim that we are ontologically 
committed to all and only those entities posited by our best scientific theories—then a 
debate about Fs can take the form of a debate about scientific theories.  If Theory 1 posits 
Fs and Theory 2 does not, then whether we accept the existence of Fs depends just on 
which theory we accept.  If this is how we understand questions about the existence and 
nature of truth, the threat of paradox is completely removed.  Or is it?   
 
2.1.  Is Truth Empiricism Paradoxical in Some Other Way? 
If it is not paradoxical to debate the nature of truth by debating over scientific 
theories, then it must be felicitous for a scientist to announce that, according to our best 
theories, there is no truth property.  But is this felicitous?  When asked, “What about the 
existence of truth?” perhaps scientist tends to reply, “I have no need of that hypothesis.”  
Does such a theory lead to paradox?  Doesn’t it entail, for example, that this sentence is 
not true? 
Suppose a far-out quantum physicist says: “There are no sentences.  The only 
things that exists are quantum fields.”  At first glance, this appears to be a contradiction.  
But there is no contradiction in the claim itself.  The claim doesn’t entail that there are 
sentences. The theory itself entails that there are no sentences.  It doesn’t matter to the 
physicist that we would describe the situation as one in which someone just uttered a 
sentence, since they reject our theory of what has just happened.  If we wanted to argue 
that the physicist should accept our theory, we would have to confront them with 
evidence to the effect that there are sentences.  But suppose their theory accounts for all 
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of the evidence we present, and suppose that it makes all sorts of important predictions 
and gives many explanations that are not available via the theory that posits sentences.  
The physicist would reject our theory for the same reasons they accept the only-quantum-
fields theory. 
The situation is similar in the case of the scientist who announces that there is no 
truth property.  Presumably by their lights there is no paradox in this statement—perhaps 
they even dropped the truth property from their theory precisely to deal with the Liar 
sentence.  The fact that we want to describe the world using the word “true” does not 
move the scientist.  They have their reasons for rejecting our theory.  The fact that we 
would describe them as saying something paradoxical is not a reason for them to abandon 
their theory—from their point of view, we are confused.  The truth empiricist can point to 
this kind of description to defuse the worry that debating the existence of truth is 
paradoxical. 
Another paradoxical situation: if evidence is that which empirically supports the 
truth of a claim, how can there be empirical evidence for truth nihilism?  The truth 
empiricist may grant that evidence might be that which empirically supports the truth of a 
claim, but the empiricist should deny that we know this on a priori grounds.  Whether 
there is an important connection between evidence and truth is an empirical question, due 
in part to the fact that the existence of truth is a question to be decided on the basis of 
evidence.  It might turn out that the best theory of evidence invokes a notion of truth, but 
it might also turn out otherwise. 
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 The truth rationalist might continue to press: but isn’t truth the aim of science?  
Don’t we employ the scientific method so as to arrive at true beliefs about the universe?  
The empiricist responds along similar lines.  Whether science aims at truth is itself an 
empirical question. 
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